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Abstract
We look at various ways of enhancing the strength of conventional
cryptosystems such as DES by building a new system which has longer
keys and which uses the original system as a building block. We pro-
pose a new variant of two-key triple encryption which is not vulnerable
to the meet in the middle attack by van Oorschot and Wiener. Under
an appropriate assumption on the security of DES, we can prove that
our system is at least as hard to break as single DES.
1 Introduction
Since its introduction in the late seventies, the American Data Encryption
Standard (DES) has been the subject of intense debate and cryptanalysis.
Like any other practical cryptosystem, DES can be broken by searching ex-
haustively for the key.
One natural direction of research is therefore to nd attacks that will
be faster than exhaustive search, measured in the number of necessary en-
cryption operations. The most successful attack known of this kind is the
linear attack by Matsui [2, 3]. This attack requires about 243 known plain-
text blocks. Although this is less than the expected 255 encryptions required
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1for exhaustive key search, the attack is by no means more practical than
exhaustive search. There are two reasons for this: rst, one cannot in prac-
tice neglect the time needed to obtain the information about the plaintext;
secondly, when doing exhaustive key search the enemy is free to invest as
much in technology as he is capable of to make the search more ecient, in
a known plaintext attack he is basically restricted to the technology of the
legitimate owner of the key, and to the frequency with which the key is used.
In virtually any practical application, a single DES key will be applied to
much less than 243 blocks, even in its entire life time. The dierence between
the two kinds of attacks is illustrated in a dramatic way by the results of
Wiener [8] who shows by concrete design of a key search machine that if
the enemy is willing to make a one million dollar investment, exhaustive key
search for DES is certainly not infeasible.
As a result, we have a situation where DES has proved very resistant over
a long period to cryptanalysis and therefore seems to be as secure as it can
be in the sense that by far the most practical attack is a simple brute force
search for the key. The only problem is that the key is too short given today's
technology, and that therefore, depending on the value of the data you are
protecting, plain DES may not be considered secure enough anymore.
What can be done about this problem? One obvious solution is to try
to design a completely new algorithm. This can only be a very long term
solution: a new algorithm has to be analysed over a long period before it can
be considered secure; also the vast number of people who have invested in
DES technology will not like the idea of their investmentsbecoming worthless
overnight. An alternative is to devise a new system with a longer key using
DES as a building block. This way existing DES implementations can still
be used.
We are in the situation, where we have a block cipher, that has proved to
be very strong, the only problem being that the keys are too small and a sim-
ple brute-force attack has become possible. Thus, this section is motivated
by the following general question: Given cryptosystem X, which cannot in
practice be broken faster than exhaustive key search, how can we build a
new system Y, such that
1. Keys in Y are signicantly longer than keys in X (e.g. twice as long)
2. Given an appropriate assumption about the security of X, Y is provably
as hard to break as X under any natural attack (e.g. ciphertext only,
2known plaintext, etc.).
3. It can be convincingly argued that Y can in fact not be broken faster
than exhaustive key search, and is therefore in fact much stronger than
X.
Possible answers to this question have already appeared in the literature.
The most well known example is known as two-key triple encryption, where
we encipher under one key, decipher under a second key, and nally encipher
under the rst key. Van Oorschot and Wiener [7] have shown, rening an
attack of Merkle and Hellman [5], that this construction is not optimal:
under a known plaintext attack, it can be broken signicantly faster than
exhaustive key search.
We propose a new variant of two-key triple encryption, which has all the
properties we require above.
2 Multiple encryption
In this section, we look at methods for enhancing cryptosystems based on the
idea of encrypting plaintext blocks more than once. Following the notation
of the introduction, we let X be the original system, and we let EK resp. DK
denote encryption resp. decryption in X under key K. We assume that the
key space of X consists of all k-bit strings, and that the block length of X
is m.I nacascade of ciphers it is assumed that the keys of the component
ciphers are independent. The following result was proved by Maurer and
Massey.
Theorem 2.1 (The importance of being rst [4].) A cascade of ciphers
is at least as hard to break as the rst cipher.
By restricting ourselves to the most powerful attack, the chosen plaintext
attack, we can prove the following more general result.
Theorem 2.2 (The importance of being there.) A cascade of ciphers
is at least as hard to break under any attack as any of the component ciphers
in the cascade under a chosen plaintext attack.
3Proof: Assume that we have an algorithm A, which on input the encryp-
tions of n known or chosen plaintexts or on input just n ciphertexts, breaks
a cascade of Nc ciphers, Y. We will use A to break any of the component
ciphers in a chosen plaintext attack. Assume that X is the i'th cipher of
the Nc ciphers in the cascade and that we can get encryptions of any cho-
sen plaintext. Choose Nc − 1 keys at random for the ciphers exclusive X.
Whenever A asks for the encryption of a chosen or known plaintext P,w e
multiple encrypt P using the rst i − 1 keys, yielding PP. In a ciphertext
only attack we choose a plaintext P ourselves. Then we get the encryption
CC of PP in the chosen plaintext setting from X. Now use the remaining
Nc − i keys to multiple encrypt CC, yielding C, which we input to A.S i n c e
by assumption, A breaks the cascade, it will output the Nc keys, amongst
which we will get a candidate for the secret key of X. We have proved that if
we can break the cascade, we can break any of the component ciphers under
a chosen plaintext attack. Thus, if a component cipher X is secure against a
chosen plaintext attack, then a cascade of ciphers containing X is as secure
against any attack. 2
A special case of a cascade of ciphers is when the component ciphers are
equal, also called multiple encryption. In the following we consider dierent
forms of multiple encryption.
2.1 Double Encryption
The simplest idea one could think of would be to encrypt twice using two keys
K1;K 2, i.e. let the ciphertext corresponding to P be C = EK2(EK1(P)). It is
clear (and well-known), however, that no matter how K1;K 2 are generated,
there is a simple meet-in-the middle attack that breaks this system under a
known plaintext attack using 2k encryptions and 2k blocks of memory, i.e.
the same time complexity as key search in the original system. Even though
the memory requirements may be unrealistic, it is clear that this is not a
satisfactory improvement over X.
2.2 Triple Encryption
Triple encryption with three independent keys K1;K 2,a n dK 3 , where the
ciphertext corresponding to P is C = EK3(EK2(EK1(P))), is also not a sat-
4isfactory solution for a similar reason as for double encryption. A simple
meet-in-the-middle attack will break this in time about 22k encryptions and
space 2k blocks of memory. Thus we do not get full return for our eort in
tripling the key length - as stated in demand 3 in the introduction, we would
like attacks to take time close to 23k,i ft h ek e yl e n g t hi s3 k . In addition
to this, if X = DES, then a simple triple encryption would preserve the
complementation property, and preserve the existence of weak keys.
It is clear, however, that no matter how the three keys in triple encryption
are generated, the meet-in-the-middle attack mentioned is still possible, and
so the time complexityof the best attack against any triple encryption variant
is no larger than 22k. It therefore seems reasonable to try to generate the
three keys from two independent X-keys K1;K 2, since triple encryption will
not provide security equivalent to more than 2 keys anyway.
2.3 Two-key Triple Encryption
One variant of this idea is well-known as two-key triple encryption, pro-
posed by W. Tuchmann [6]: we let the ciphertext corresponding to P be
EK1(DK2(EK1(P))). Compatibility with a single encryption can be obtained
by setting K1 = K2. As one can see, this uses a particular, very simple way
of generating the three keys from K1;K 2. For two-key triple encryption there
is a result similar to Theorem 2.2.
Theorem 2.3 Under a chosen plaintext/ciphertext attack two-key triple en-
cryption is at least as hard to break as the underlying cipher.
Proof: Assume that we have an algorithm B, which on input n chosen plain-
texts, breaks a two-key triple encryption scheme, Z,w h e r eWis the under-
lying cipher. Choose one key K1;3 at random. Whenever B asks for the
encryption of plaintext P, we encrypt P using the key K1;3, yielding PP.
Then we get the decryption CC of PP in the chosen ciphertext setting from
W. Now encrypt CC using again the key K1;3 yielding C, which is input to
B. Since by assumption B breaks the two-key triple scheme, it will output
a candidate for the key in the second round, i.e. for the secret key of W. 2
Even though this result establishes some connection between the secu-
rity of two-key triple encryption with the underlying cipher, it holds only
for a chosen plaintext/ciphertext attack and still does not meet our second
demand.
5For the two-key triple encryption scheme, each of K1 and K2 only inﬂu-
ences particular parts of the encryption process. Because of this, variants
of the meet-in-the-middle attack are possible that are even faster than ex-
haustive search for K1;K 2. In [5] Merkle and Hellman describes an attack
on two-key triple DES encryption requiring 256 chosen plaintext-ciphertext
pairs and a running time of 256 encryptions using 256 words of memory. This
attack was rened in [7] into a known plaintext attack on the DES, which on
input n plaintext-ciphertext pairs nds the secret key in time 2120=n using n
words of memory. The attacks can be applied to any block cipher.
Since the attacks exploit that the keys used in the rst and third encryp-
tion are equal, an initial attempt to thwart the attacks could be to let the
third key be dependent on both the rst and second key. Dene encryption
by EK1(DK2(EK3(P))), where K3 = EK1(K2)  K2. Compatibility with a
single encryption can still be obtained by setting K2 = DK1(0), in that way
K2 = K3. By the security of the DM-scheme, the Davies-Meyer hashing
scheme, knowing K1 (or K2) does not give immediate knowledge about K3
and the scheme seems invulnerable to the attacks by Merkle and Hellman.
However, we found no proof that this scheme is at least as secure as a single
encryption.
We therefore propose what we believe to be stronger methods for gener-
ating the keys. Our main idea is to generate them pseudorandomly from 2
X keys using a generator based on the security of X. In this way, an en-
emy trying to break Y either has to treat the 3 keys as if they were really
random which means he has to break X, according to Theorem 2.1; or he
has to use the dependency between the keys - this mean breaking the gen-
erator which was also based on X! Thus, even though we have thwarted
attacks like Merkle-Hellman and van Oorschot-Wiener by having a strong
interdependency between the keys, we can still, if X is secure enough, get a
connection between security of X and Y.
3 Multiple encryption with minimum key
3.1 General Description of Y
Let a block cipher X be given, as described above. The key length of X
is denoted by k.B y E K ( P ), we denote X-encryption under K of block P,
6while DK(C) denotes decryption of C. We then dene a new block cipher Y
using a function G:
G(K1;K 2)=( X 1;X 2;X 3)
which maps 2 X-keys to 3 X-keys. We display later a concrete example of a
possible G-function. This is constructed from a few X-encryptions. Keys in
Y will consist of pairs (K1;K 2)o fX-keys. Encryption in Y is dened by
EK1;K2(P)=E X 3( E X 2( E X 1( P)));
where (X1;X 2;X 3)=G ( K 1;K 2). Decryption is clearly possible by decrypt-
ing using the Xi's in reverse order.
3.2 Relation to the security of X
We would like to be reasonably sure that we have taken real advantage of
the strength of X when designing Y. One way of stating this is to say that
Y is at least as hard to break as X. By Theorem 2.1, this would be trivially
true if the three keys used in Y were statistically independent. This is of
course not the case, since the Xi's are generated from only 2 keys. But if the
generating function G has a pseudorandom property as stated below, then
the Xi's are "as good as random" and we can still prove the result we want.
Denition 3.1 Consider the following experiment: an enemy B is presented
with three k-bit blocks X1;X 2;X 3. He then tries to guess which of two cases
has occurred:
1. The Xi's are chosen independently at random.
2. The Xi's are equal to G(K1;K 2), for randomly chosen K1;K 2.
Let p1 be the probability that B guesses 1 given that case 1 occurs, and p2
the probability that B guesses 1 given that case 2 occurs. The generator
function G is said to be pseudorandom, if for any B spending time equal to
T encryption operations,
jp1 − p2j
T
V
;
where V is the total number of possible values of the pair (K1;K 2).
7The intuition behind this is that B could always spend his time simply
trying random pairs of keys, seeing if they could be a possible value of K1;K 2,
and guessing that he is in case 2 if he nds a solution. If case 2 really occurs,
he nds the right value with probability at most T=V (we assume here that
he would need at least one encryption to test a pair). In case 1 there is most
likely no solution. Thus the denition says that if G is pseudorandom, there
is no better method for B than this naive attack. Denition 3.1 is inspired
by the complexity theoretic denition of a strong pseudorandom generator
introduced by Blum and Micali [1].
In the rest of this subsection we consider attacks against X and Y in a
xed scenario with a given plaintext distribution and a given form of attack,
such as known plaintext, chosen plaintext, etc. We do not specify these
things further, because the reasoning below will work for any such scenario.
The time unit will be encryptions operations in system X.
The next theorem shows the promised connection between security of X
and Y, i.e. in a given amount of time, an attack cannot do much better
against Y than what is possible against X.
Theorem 3.1 Let p be the success probability of the best attack against X
running in time T. Assume now that an attacker A against our new system
Y runs in time T and has success probability p+. If the function G used to
construct Y is pseudorandom, then
 
T
V
Proof: Let Y0 be the same system as Y, but with independent keys Xi.B y
Theorem 2.1, using A against Y0 leads to an attack against X with the same
success probability. Hence by assumption, A's success probability against Y0
will be at most p. But then we can use A to make an algorithm B that ts
Denition 3.1: Given X1;X 2;X 3,Buses these as keys in the triple encryption
system and simulate A's attack. If A is successful, B will guess that the Xi's
are generated from K1;K 2,i fn o t ,Bwill guess that they are independent.
Since in one case A will be attacking Y, and in the other case Y0,i ti sc l e a r
that for this B, we have by Denition 3.1
 j p 1−p 2j
T
V
82
As an example of what the statement of the theorem means, consider
an ideal case, where the best an attack against X can do, is to spend its
time choosing random keys and test whether they t with the information
available. The success probability for time T would then be T=2k assuming
a key can be tested in 1 encryption. Then the above theorem says that if G
is pseudorandom, the success probability of any attack against Y running in
time T can be at most T=2k+T=22k. This is larger than the original success
probability against X by a factor of only 1 + 2−k.
3.3 A Concrete Two-key Triple Encryption Construc-
tion
We propose here a new construction for triple encryption, called TEMK for
Triple Encryption with Minimum Key. In this construction X1;X 2;X 3 are
all used as keys for encryption. We dene this construction of G(K1;K 2)=
( X 1;X 2;X 3)b y :
X 1 = E K 1( D K 2( E K 1( IV1)))
X2 = EK1(DK2(EK1(IV2)))
X3 = EK1(DK2(EK1(IV3)))
where IVi are three initial values, e.g. IVi = C +i,w h e r eCis a constant.
It is seen that two-key triple encryption is used.
Here, the reader may ask a (very legitimate) question: why are we using
ordinary two-key triple DES here, when we have just spent half a paper
arguing that it does not provide good enough security? The answer is that we
are using two-key triple DES in a special situation where we can guarantee
t h a tf o ra n yp a r t i c u l a rp a i ro fk e y s ,t h ee n e m yw i l lg e ta tm o s tak n o w n
plaintext attack with three known plaintexts. This follows from the fact that
the three constants IV1;IV 2;IV 3 are universally xed, such that the pair of
keys K1;K 2 will never be applied to anything else than the IVi's. The best
known attack against two-key triple DES with three known plaintexts is the
one by van Oorschot and Wiener [7], which has the complexity 2120=3 '
1:3  2118. Since in our case the keys are only 112 bits, we conjecture that
this G is pseudorandom with the value V =2 112. The most natural attack
9Scheme Key size # KS # EN Total W.k. C.p.
TEMK-DES 112 5 9 19 No No
DES 56 1 0 2 Yes Yes
Two-key triple-DES 112 2 0 4 Yes Yes
Three-key triple-DES 168 3 0 6 Yes Yes
Table 1: Comparison of the proposed schemes and the existing ones, all used
with DES
against pseudorandomness of G seems to be to guess either K1 or K2 and
try to nd the other value faster than exhaustive search.
The key scheduling in the above construction is slower than for the two-
key triple encryption. In most software applications of the DES the key
scheduling takes about twice the time of a single encryption. Using this es-
timate the key scheduling in the triple encryption scheme above takes time
about 19 DES-encryptions. For comparison the key schedules for two-key
triple DES and triple DES with three independent keys take 4 and 6 encryp-
tions, respectively. In encryption with our new construction the key schedule
should be performed once and the three round keys stored. In that way en-
cryption with TEMK-DES is as fast as for other triple encryption schemes
with xed keys.
We conjecture that for the above construction, the fastest attack is a
simple meet in the middle attack, which will be of time complexity at least
22k. In particular, we conjecture that because of the strong interdependency
between the Xi's, attacks likethe ones from [5, 7] will not be possible. Finally
we note that the absence of weak keys are guaranteed, since the three round
keys are never equal and the complementation property does not hold. In
Table 1 we give a schematic overview of the dierences between our proposed
scheme and the existing ones. KS and EN are the numbers of DES key
schedules and DES encryptions respectively, needed in the key schedule of
the triple encryption scheme. 'Total' is the total number of encryptions in
the new key schedule using the above estimate. Finally we state if weak keys
exist and if the complementation property holds.
103.4 Extensions
In the preceding sections we focused on triple encryption schemes. It is clear
that our ideas can be extended to quadruple, quintuple, ...., n-fold schemes.
Let X be a component cipher with key size k. In general a 2i-fold encryption
scheme based on X is vulnerable to a meet in a middle attack using 2ik
words of memory taking time about 2ik. Similarly, a (2i+1)-fold encryption
scheme based on X is vulnerable to a meet in a middle attack using 2ik words
of memory taking time about 2(i+1)k. Therefore, one does not get the security
of the full key length. It is obvious that by generating the 2i (2i +1 )k e y s
pseudorandomly, dened in a similar manner as Denition 3.1, from i (i+1)
keys one can prove a similar result as Theorem 3.1.
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